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Abstract
Recent theoretical work has examined the spatial distribution of unemployment
using the eﬃciency wage model as the mechanism by which unemployment arises in
the urban economy. This paper extends the standard eﬃciency wage model in order to
allow for behavioral substitution between leisure time at home and eﬀo r ta tw o r k .I n
equilibrium, residing at a location with a long commute aﬀects the time available for
l e i s u r ea th o m ea n dt h e r e f o r ea ﬀects the trade-oﬀ between eﬀort at work and risk of un-
employment. This model implies an empirical relationship between expected commutes
and labor market outcomes, which is tested using the Public Use Microdata sample of
the 2000 U.S. Decennial Census. The empirical results suggest that eﬃciency wages
operate primarily for blue collar workers, i.e. workers who tend to be in occupations
that face higher levels of supervision. For this subset of workers, longer commutes
imply higher levels of unemployment and higher wages, which are both consistent with
shirking and leisure being substitutable.
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11 Introduction
Many U.S. metropolitan areas as well as European cities are characterized by a concentration
of poverty and unemployment in speciﬁc regions of their central cities and inner ring suburbs.
The concentration of poverty and unemployment in a neighborhood may have external eﬀects
on other neighborhood residents leading to poor outcomes in education and family structure,
and further exacerbating negative labor market outcomes.1 Recently, a body of theoretical
work has developed that explores the spatial distribution of urban unemployment. A common
approach in the literature is to use the eﬃciency wage model as the mechanism by which
unemployment arises in the urban economy. For example, Zenou and Smith (1995) develop
a model in which housing prices and workers’ location (land market), as well as wages and
unemployment (labor market) are determined in equilibrium, and Brueckner and Zenou
(2003) examine the impact of job decentralization or spatial mismatch on unemployment
using a similar eﬃciency wage model.2 However, up to this point, no empirical work has
been conducted to test whether eﬃciency wage models can explain the spatial distribution
of unemployment and earnings within urban labor markets
This paper extends the standard eﬃciency wage model in order to allow for behavioral
s u b s t i t u t i o nb e t w e e nl e i s u r et i m ea th o m ea n de ﬀort or shirking at work. Given that shirking
is a form of leisure, any change to an individual’s time endowment is likely to aﬀect the
utility from shirking. Further, unless time endowment diﬀerences are completely observed
by ﬁrms, ﬁrms will not pay wages that are below the level required to eliminate all shirking
in equilibrium in contrast to the standard eﬃciency wage model (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984).
This new eﬃciency wage model with substitution is imbedded into a standard urban model
with commuting and a land market. In equilibrium, residing at a location with a long
commute aﬀects the trade-oﬀ between eﬀo r ta tw o r ka n dt h ef r e q u e n c yo fu n e m p l o y m e n t
spells by reducing the time available for leisure. This model suggests that either workers eﬀort
provided at work or wages vary based upon a worker’s residential location, depending upon
whether ﬁrms can discriminate based on residential location. Such an extension to allow for
substitution between leisure and shirking would appear to be especially relevant for urban
models of unemployment because these models have been developed to understand the spatial
distribution of unemployment and earnings and such models imply substantial diﬀerences in
1A considerable body of research has developed documenting the impact of residential location on em-
ployment outcomes; a few recent examples include Bayer, Ross, and Topa (2004) and Topa (2001) on social
interactions, Weinberg, Reagan and Yankow (2005) and Katz, Kling, and Liebman (2001) on neighborhood
quality, and Weinberg (2000) and Ross (1998) on job access.
2See Zenou (2008) for an overview on urban unemployment and eﬃciency wages.
2time endowments net of commuting across residential locations. Further, this model implies
the existence of a relationship between expected commutes and either employment and/or
wages, which we will test empirically in this paper.
In the empirical portion of the paper, we estimate the relationship between commutes and
employment or earnings using an instrumental variable model. Speciﬁcally, we instrument
for an individual worker’s commute based on across metropolitan diﬀerences in the likelihood
of each worker choosing speciﬁc housing features. The models are estimated using workers in
large and mid-sized metropolitan areas drawn from the 2000 Public Use Microdata Sample
of the U.S. Decennial Census. The workers are divided into heavily supervised and lightly
supervised occupations, and separate models are estimated for the two samples. For workers
in heavily supervised occupations, we ﬁnd that unemployment and wages both increase with
commute times, which is consistent with substitutability between shirking and leisure and
with ﬁrms being partially able to base wages on commutes in order to reduce shirking among
workers with long commutes. These ﬁndings are also consistent with the idea that eﬃciency
wages tend to be paid to blue collar workers, who tend to be in occupations that face high
levels of supervision presumably because the cost of shirking is high in those occupations.
Some previous research has examined the empirical relationship between commutes and
labor market outcomes. In the spatial mismatch literature, a substantial number of studies
use average commute time as a proxy for employment access and sometimes ﬁnd a positive
relationship between commutes and employment interpreting these ﬁndings as evidence of
imperfections in urban labor markets.3 Further, Zax and Kain (1991) examined the quit
rates of white and black employees following the relocation of their current employer from
downtown Detroit to the suburbs. While they ﬁnd that the change in commute times af-
fected black quit rates, these changes had no eﬀect on white employees who presumably
faced less location constraints in the housing market. On the other hand, empirical studies
of wages and commutes usually focus on the prediction in competitive labor markets that
ﬁrms located further from workers, usually near the center of the central business district,
must pay a wage premium to compensate workers for that longer commute. White (1999)
provides a detailed survey of empirical studies of the urban wage gradient. Some examples
include Madden (1985) who ﬁnds a positive relationship between wage change and change
in commute for workers who changed jobs, Timothy and Wheaton (2001) who ﬁnd that
average commutes in an employment location can explain across location wage diﬀerences,
and Manning (2003) who shows that an extra hour of commuting each day is associated, on
3However, studies employing more precise measures of employment access tend to ﬁnd a more robust
relationship (Ihlanfeldt and Sjoquist, 1998).
3average, with an increase in wages of between 3 and 28 percent depending upon the sample
and the speciﬁcation. On the other hand, Zax (1991) ﬁnds a positive relationship between
commutes and wages using the relocation of a single Detroit ﬁrm, which is the ﬁrst evidence
to suggest that wages may vary across workers at the same ﬁrm based on those worker’s com-
mutes, a phenomenon that is not consistent with competitive labor markets. Our theoretical
model provides one possible explanation for why employment and wages might vary with
commutes even after controlling for employment location, and the empirical portion of our
study develops an instrumental variables strategy that allows us to test whether commutes
or expected commutes as a result of a worker’s residential location aﬀects employment and
wages.
Existing empirical studies of eﬃciency wages tend to focus on across industry wage diﬀer-
entials. Speciﬁcally, a wide variety of studies, Krueger and Summers (1987, 1988), Dickens
and Katz (1987), Murphy and Topel (1987, 1990), and Gibbons and Katz, test for the ex-
istence of unexplained wage diﬀerentials and whether those diﬀerentials can be explained
by unobserved diﬀerences in worker ability or productivity. Neal (1993) attempts a more
direct test of the theory by examining whether across industry diﬀerences in supervision can
explain across industry wage diﬀerentials. More recently, however, several studies focus on
within industry or ﬁrm diﬀerentials with Chen and Edin (2002) examining wage diﬀeren-
tials between piece rate and hourly pay and Lazear (2000) and Paarsh and Shearer (2000)
examining the link between productivity and wages. This study complements these earlier
studies by providing a test for eﬃciency wages that exploits an entirely diﬀe r e n ts o u r c eo f
empirical variation; namely, the empirical relationship between employment and wages and
a length of a worker’s expected commute.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the theory.
Sections 3 and 4 are devoted to the empirical strategy, the data and the results. In section
5, we perform some robustness checks. Finally, section 6 concludes.
2T h e o r y
2.1 The model
There is a continuum of workers (employed or unemployed) uniformly distributed along a
monocentric, linear and closed city who endogenously decide their eﬀort level at work e
and the optimal residential location between the business district and the city fringe. They
all consume the same amount of land (normalized to 1 for simplicity) and the density of
4residential land parcels is taken to be unity so that there are exactly x units of housing
within a distance x of the business district.
All ﬁrms are assumed to be exogenously located in the Business District (BD hereafter).
The BD is a unique employment center located at one end of the linear city. In a centralized
city, it corresponds to the central business district, whereas in a completely decentralized
city, it represents suburban employment. As will be clear below, what is crucial here is
not the location of the BD but the distance between workers’ residential location and their
workplace (i.e. the BD). All land is owned by absentee landlords.4 Each worker (employed
or unemployed) who consumes one unit of land is assumed to be inﬁnitely lived and risk
neutral. Workers endogenously decide their optimal place of residence between the BD (i.e.
0)a n dt h ec i t yf r i n g e( xf). The total population is normalized to 1 so that the unemployment
rate is equal to the unemployment level and is given by u, Similarly, the employment rate is
equal to the employment level and is given by 1 − u.
At any moment, workers can either be employed or unemployed. If employed he/she ob-
tains a wage w whereas if unemployed he/she gets an unemployment beneﬁt b.W ea s s u m e
that changes in the employment status (employment versus unemployment) are governed
by a continuous-time Markov process. Job contacts (that is the transition rate from un-
employment to employment) randomly occur at an endogenous rate θ while the exogenous
job separation rate is δ. In this context, the expected duration of employment is given by
1/δ whereas the expected duration of unemployment amounts to 1/θ.I tt h e nf o l l o w st h a ta
worker spends a fraction θ/(θ + δ) of his/her lifetime employed and a fraction δ/(θ + δ) of






Observe from (1) that the steady state unemployment and employment rates correspond to
the respective fractions of time a worker remains unemployed and employed over his/her
inﬁnite lifetime. Equation (1) can also be interpreted as the probability a worker will be
unemployed in steady state.
Let us now determine the instantaneous utilities of an employed and an unemployed
4All theses assumptions are very standard in urban economics, see Fujita (1989). The key assumption
that might give readers pause is the concentration of employment in one location. Many urban models have
generalized the classic monocentric model to allow for decentralized or multi-centric employment, see Ross
and Yinger (1995) for example. The main behavioral results arising from the monocentric urban model
invariably hold in these more general model with individuals who face the same commuting costs making
similar decisions regardless of their employment location.
5worker. For the employed, the utility function is separable and is given by:5
z1 + V (l,e)
where z1 is the quantity of a (non-spatial) composite good (taken as the numeraire) consumed
by the employed and V (.) is assumed to be increasing in leisure l and decreasing in eﬀort
e, and concave in both arguments. This choice of the utility function aims at capturing the
fact that eﬀort and leisure are not independent activities. Indeed, if one interprets −e as the
leisure activity on the job (shirking), then the beneﬁts arising from additional leisure activity
on the job is obviously related to the extent of leisure activity at home and vice versa.6 We




Indeed, low leisure at home may imply that the worker has less time for rest and relaxation
and more pressed for time at home (less time for relaxation or errands), and as a result
the beneﬁt of taking leisure or conducting home production (relaxation or errands) while
at work rises. This story is consistent with increasing disutility from e as leisure falls or
∂2V (l,e)/∂l∂e > 0, and the level of e will fall as commutes increase.
We are now able to write the budget constraint of an employed worker. Each worker
purchases the good z produced and incurs τx in monetary commuting costs when he/she
lives at distance x from the BD. Letting R(x) denote rent per unit of land, the budget
constraint of an employed worker at distance x can be written as follows:
wT = z1 + R(x)+τx (3)
where w i st h ep e r - h o u rw a g ea n dT denotes the amount of working hours. T is assumed to
be the same and constant across workers, an assumption that agrees with most jobs in the
vast majority of developed countries.
5Subscripts ‘1’a n d‘ 0’ respectively refer to the employed and the unemployed groups.
6While this model does not incorporate a full home production model as in Becker (1965), leisure time at
home might reasonably be viewed as a composite good that encompasses a variety of home activities. The
traditional home production model implies that changes in the wage rate will cause substitution between
home and market production (Baxter and Jerman, 1999). It also seems reasonable that changes in the time
available at home, possibly due to a long commute, is likely to inﬂuence the distribution of personal activities
between home and work.
7T h ec a s ew h e r ee ﬀort and leisure are complements is not treated here because it is not consistent with
what we ﬁnd in the empirical analysis. However, in our working paper (Ross and Zenou, 2007), we have a
complete analysis of this case.
6Each worker provides a ﬁxed amount of labor time T so that the time available for leisure
l depends solely on commuting time. Thus, denoting by tx the commuting time from distance
x (where t>0 is the time commuting cost per unit of distance), the time constraint of an
employed worker at distance x can be written as:
1 − T = l + tx (4)
in which the total amount of time is normalized to 1 without loss of generality.
By plugging (3) and (4) into the utility function, we obtain the following indirect utility
for the employed:
I1(x,e)=z1 + V (l,e)=wT − R(x) − τx+ V (1 − T − tx,e) (5)
Let us now focus on the unemployed. Their budget constraint is given by:
b = z0 + R(x)+τx (6)
where b is the unemployment beneﬁt. In this formulation, we assume for simplicity that
employed and unemployed workers have the same monetary commuting costs. The former
commute every day to work whereas the latter commute every day for interviews.
To keep the analysis manageable and to be consistent with the utility of the employed,
we assume that the unemployed’s utility function is given by: z0 + V0,8 and, without loss of
generality, we normalize b to zero. In this formulation, V0 is a constant utility beneﬁta r i s i n g
to all who are unemployed. Basically, V0 is introduced to recognize the inherent disutility
to being at work and commuting to work since it assures that when people have exactly the
same z, the one working can receive less utility.
By using (6), we obtain the following indirect utility function for the unemployed:
I0(x)=z0 + V0 = −R(x) − τx+ V0
We are now able to calculate the expected utility of each worker. To do that, we assume
perfect capital markets with a zero interest rate.9 Borrowing and lending are not permitted.
8This formulation assumes that there is no search behavior from the unemployed. They just obtain a job
randomly. This is consistent with the standard assumptions of exogenous reemployment probability in the
eﬃciency wage model. Observe that all our basic results go through if we allow for search with time and
commuting costs for the unemployed. The analysis just gets messier.
9When there is a zero interest rate, workers have no int r i n s i cp r e f e r e n c ef o rt h ep r e s e n ts ot h a tt h e yo n l y
care about the fraction of time they spend employed and unemployed. Therefore, the expected utilities are
not state dependent.
7We also assume that there are very high mobility costs.10 This implies that aw o r k e r ’ s
residential location remains ﬁxed as he/she enters and leaves unemployment.T h i si sm u c h
more realistic than assuming that changes in employment status involve changes in residential
location. In fact, for workers to stay in the same location and thus pay the same bid rent
over their lifetime, it has to be that they adjust their composite consumption. It is easy to
verify that
z1 − z0 = wT > 0
which means that workers consume less composite good when unemployed. This diﬀerence
increases with wages since better paid workers consume more composite good only when
employed.11
Since a worker spends a fraction 1 − u = θ/(θ + δ) of his/her lifetime employed and a
fraction u = δ/(θ + δ) unemployed, at any moment of time, the utility of a worker is thus
equal to that worker’s average utility over the job cycle and is given by
I =( 1 − u)I1(x,e)+uI0(x)
=( 1 − u)[wT + V (1 − T − tx,e)] − R(x) − τx+ uV 0 (7)
Because workers can provide diﬀerent eﬀort levels depending on their location, the informa-
tion available to ﬁrms about workers’ residence will matter in the process of wage formation.
As a result, we consider two diﬀerent information structures. In the ﬁrst one, ﬁrms cannot
observe workers’ residence while they can perfectly observe the residential location of all
workers in the second case.
2.2 The equilibrium when ﬁrms do not observe workers’ location
Each individual supplies one unit of labor. There are only two possible eﬀort levels: either
the worker shirks, exerting eﬀort eS = e > 0, and contributing e units to production, or
he/she does not shirk, providing eﬀort eNS = e>e , and contributes e units to production.
The implication of this eﬃciency model, which allows for substitution between leisure and
shirking behavior, diﬀers from the standard eﬃciency wage model (Shapiro and Stiglitz,
1984) in that some shirking is possible and can persist in equilibrium.
10A similar assumption can be found in Brueckner and Zenou (2003) and Zenou (2006).
11Many intertemporal models recognize that households might engage in precautionary savings in order
to protect against negative shocks, such as unemployment, and in those types of models consumption may
not fall or at least will fall less during spells of unemployment. In this model, however, consumers have no
incentive to smooth consumption because consumption of the composite commodity, z, enters utility in a
linear fashion and interest and discount rates are both zero.
8Using (7), and given that all workers obtain the same wage, this implies that the expected
indirect utilities of non-shirker and shirker workers are respectively equal to:12
I
NS
no (x,e)=( 1− u





S)[wnoT + V (1 − T − tx,e)] − Rno(x) − τx+ u
S V0
which are simply weighted averages of the utility levels when employed and unemployed and
where the share of time spent unemployed is used to form the weights.
Since shirking is not perfectly detected by ﬁrms, we assume that there is a monitoring









θ + m + δ
(9)
with uS >u NS, ∀δ,θ,m > 0. All workers (shirking or not shirking) must in equilibrium
obtain the same utility level Ino, which is location independent. Since workers stay in the
same location all their life, bid rents are given by:14
Ψ
NS(x,Ino)=( 1− u
NS)[wnoT + V (1 − T − tx,e)] − τx+ u
NSV0 − Ino (10)
Ψ
S(x,Ino)=( 1− u
S)[wnoT + V (1 − T − tx,e)] − τx+ u
S V0 − Ino (11)
Inspection of these two equations shows that, as usual, the bid-rent functions are decreasing
in x,w i t h∂ΨNS(x,Ino)/∂x < 0 and ∂ΨS(x,Ino)/∂x < 0. In the present model, this reﬂects
the combined inﬂuence of the time cost of commuting and the monetary cost. Let us denote
by e x the border between non-shirkers and shirkers. We have the following result.15
12The subscript no refers to the “non-observable” case.
13In the present model, as in most eﬃciency wage models, ﬁrms can choose the wage w, but have no ability
to change monitoring eﬀort m. It is just assumed that monitoring and wages are substitute instruments.
However, by developing a model where ﬁrms choose both w and m, Allgulin and Ellingsen (2002) have
shown that, if workers only have a choice between two eﬀort levels (working and shirking), the accuracy of
monitoring and the level of pay are still negatively related.
14The use of bid-rent curves are standard in models with land markets and commuting, and in these types
of models rents are assumed to adjust so that in equilibrium consumers are indiﬀerent between diﬀerent
locations in the city.
15All proofs of propositions can be found in the Appendix.
9Proposition 1 Assume (2). Then, workers who reside close to jobs will choose not to shirk
whereas workers located farther away will shirk.
Indeed, if eﬀort and leisure are substitutes, workers residing close to jobs will provide
more eﬀort than those residing further away from jobs because they have lower commuting
time and thus more leisure time at home. Let us now determine e xno, the boundary between
shirking and non-shirking workers where a consumer is indiﬀerent between high and low levels
of eﬀo r ta tw o r k .T oo b t a i nt h ev a l u eo fe xno,w eh a v et os o l v e :ΨNS(e xno,Ino)=ΨS(e xno,Ino),
which is equivalent to:
(1−u
S)V (1 − T − te xno,e)−(1−u
NS)V (1 − T − te xno,e)=( u
S −u
NS)(wnoT − V0) (12)
showing a clear trade oﬀ between shirking (higher utility V (·) when employed since less eﬀort
but more unemployment spells during the lifetime) and nonshirking. Adopting the following
notations, V (1 − T − te xno,e) ≡ e V NS
no and V (1 − T − te xno,e) ≡ e V S















Proposition 2 Assume (2). Then, higher wages reduce the fraction of nonshirkers in the
city, i.e. ∂e xno/∂wno > 0.
This proposition states that wages aﬀect e xno the border between shirkers and non-shirkers.
Indeed, if (2) holds, i.e. eﬀort and leisure are substitutes, then when wages are higher, less
workers shirk (the fraction of shirkers 1 − e xno decreases) since there are more incentive not
to shirk (the average wage diﬀerence wnoT(uS − uNS) between shirkers and non-shirkers
increases).













To obtain this result, the main condition is (14) because it guarantees an interior solution
by separating workers over space. The intuition behind this assumption is quite reasonable
and consistent with the intuition behind the assumption stated in equation (7). Consider a
plot of the marginal utility of leisure ∂V/∂l against eﬀort with eﬀort on the horizontal axis,
10which is positively sloped by equation (7). For low levels of the marginal utility of leisure
(high levels of leisure), eﬀort at work probably has little impact on the marginal utility of
leisure because the worker is well rested and his/her home is well ordered. The resulting plot
of ∂V/∂l is fairly ﬂat. On the other hand, for high levels of ∂V/∂l (low leisure), eﬀort at
work is probably quite important, and the plot of ∂V/∂l is likely to be quite steep. Under
these conditions, the eﬀect of a decrease in l on ∂V/∂l is larger in magnitude at high levels
of eﬀort, which is consistent with equation (14).
Let us now determine the labor market equilibrium. We consider a closed city model in
which Ino is endogenous and the city fringe is equal to 1 (the size of the total population is
1 since land consumption is 1). There are Mno ﬁr m si nt h ee c o n o m y .T h ep r o ﬁtf u n c t i o no f












where the total number of employed workers is Lno = LS
no+LNS
no , αno is the fraction of workers
hired by each ﬁrm, and F(·) is the production function, with F0(·) > 0 and F00(·) < 0.T h e
total number of non-shirkers in the economy is given by
L
NS
no = e xno(1 − u
NS) (15)
the total number of shirkers is
L
S
no =( 1− e xno)(1 − u
S) (16)
We impose here that there is no discrimination in wages, which means that all workers,
whatever their location, obtain the same wage. We also impose that ﬁrms employ the same
fraction αno of workers (shirkers and nonshirkers).16 Thus, even if ﬁrms know that all workers
residing beyond e xno will shirk, they have to pay them the same wage as the ones who live
between 0 and e xno (nonshirkers). This, in particular, implies that employment is lower when
commuting times are longer.
L e tu sn o ws o l v et h eﬁrm’s program. By taking e, e, uS and uNS as given, each ﬁrm
chooses wno and αno that maximize its proﬁt. When choosing wno ﬁrms will face the following
trade oﬀ.B e c a u s ei ta ﬀects e xno, higher wages implies that the fraction of shirkers hired will
be lower (Proposition 2) and thus total output increases but labor costs are also higher since
the wage given to workers is the same. When choosing αno ﬁrms face the following trade
16This might seem unreasonable, but actually if the location of the workers at a given ﬁrm are distributed
randomly then over time the ﬁrms share of shirking workers at any wage should mirror the economies share,
and individual ﬁrms can directly eﬀect their fraction of shirkers with their wage.
11oﬀ.H i g h e rαno means that more workers are hired, which implies that ﬁrms have a higher
output but also higher labor costs. We have the following proposition.
Proposition 3 Assume (2) and (14). Then, ﬁr m sa l w a y sw a n tt oa l l o ws o m es h i r k i n gi n
equilibrium and all shirkers live at the periphery of the city.
We show that it is optimal for each ﬁrm to set a wage given by (30) in the Appendix. This
wage is set by taking into account the fact that it aﬀects e xno, the fraction of non-shirkers
in the each ﬁrm, via (12). Of course, one has to verify that the wage, given by (30) in
the Appendix, indeed maximizes ﬁrms’ proﬁt and corresponds to a strictly interior e xno, i.e.
e xno ∈ ]0,1[. We assume here a strictly interior solution for e xno.
In equilibrium, it has to be that labor supply equals labor demand for nonshirkers and
shirkers respectively. Since the total population of workers is equal to 1, these conditions
can be written as:
αnoMnoL
NS




no =( 1− e xno)(1 − u
S)





We are now able to deﬁne the equilibrium of this economy. Assume that (2) and (14)
hold. Then, nonshirkers are close to jobs whereas the shirkers are far away. In the Appendix,
we give a formal deﬁnition of this equilibrium and it can then be shown that it exists and is
unique.
2.3 The equilibrium when ﬁrms do observe workers’ location
Assume now that ﬁrms do observe workers’ location. The utility of each worker is still given
by (7). Now, as we will show below, there will be no shirking in equilibrium. This implies
that the unemployment rate of the economy is given by (8). The bid rent of a (non-shirker)
worker is equal to:17
Ψ(x,Io)=( 1− u
NS)[wo(x)T + V (1 − T − tx,e)] − τx+ u
NSV0 − Io (18)














17The subscript o refers to the “observable” case.
12which can be positive or negative depending on the sign of w0
o(x) (it will determined below).
Since all workers provide the same eﬀort level and are identical in all respects, they just
locate anywhere in the city and enjoy the same utility level Io, the land rent adjusting for
commuting cost diﬀerences between diﬀerent locations.
To close the urban equilibrium, we have to check that Ψ(1,Io)=0 ,w h i c hi se q u i v a l e n t
to:
Io =( 1− u
NS)[wo(1)T + V (1 − T − t,e)] − τ + u
NSV0 (20)
At each location x in the city (0 ≤ x<1), each ﬁrm has to set a NSC (that equates shirking
and non-shirking utilities) to prevent shirking. We obtain18
wo(x)=






This is the standard Shapiro-Stiglitz style non-shirking condition evaluated in equilibrium
for every residential location x. It should be clear that, when ﬁrms can observe workers’
location, it is optimal for them to wage discriminate in terms of location and not to allow
shirking in equilibrium. In the previous model, this was not possible since each ﬁrm had to
give to all its workers the same wage and thus it was somehow optimal to let some workers
shirk.
Proposition 4 Assume (2). Then, w0
o(x) > 0.
Thus wages are higher when commuting times are longer. Indeed, if leisure and eﬀort are
substitutes (i.e. (2) holds), then wages have to compensate workers who live further away
since they commute more and thus have less time for leisure at home. As a result, wages
increase with distance to jobs.
Using (19), Proposition 4 implies that when (2) holds, w0
o(x) > 0 and thus the sign of
∂Ψ(x,Io)/∂x is ambiguous. This is because there are two opposite eﬀects. On the one hand,
workers residing far away have higher wages. On the other, they have higher monetary
commuting costs and also higher time costs and thus lower leisure. The compensation of
the land rent is therefore not straightforward. Because we would like land rents to decrease









18A si nt h ep r e v i o u sm o d e l ,w eh a v eh e r et h ea s s u m p t i o nt h a tﬁrms receive an equal share of workers from
each location.
13i.e., the wage is lower than the commuting cost eﬀect so that land rents compensate workers
who reside further away. Using (8) and (9), this can be written as:
0 <
∂V (1 − T − tx,e)
∂lo
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which guarantees that bid rents are always decreasing. This condition encompasses (2).
Let us now deﬁne the labor demand αo of each ﬁrm. Since all ﬁrms are identical, let
us focus on a symmetric (steady-state) equilibrium in which each ﬁrm employs the same
number of workers α. The proﬁto fe a c hﬁrm is given by:































Equation (24) means that each ﬁrm adjusts employment until the marginal product of an
additional worker equals the average eﬃciency wage. Finally, the equilibrium condition






In the Appendix, we give a deﬁnition of this equilibrium. Again, it can then be shown
that it exists and is unique.
2.4 The intermediate case: Firms partially observe workers’ loca-
tion
The theory has discussed so far the two extreme cases where ﬁrms can or cannot observe
where workers live. An intermediate case may arise if commute time is only partially ob-
served. For example, ﬁrms may observe residential location, which provides a noisy signal of
14a worker’s commute, but it is too costly for ﬁr m st od e t e r m i n et h et r u ec o m m u t e so fw o r k e r s .
Further, residing a long distance from one’s workplace leads to both a longer commute and
a greater variance in the error associated with a ﬁrm’s estimate of a worker’s commute be-
cause the long distance creates more opportunities for idiosyncratic factors that aﬀect point
to point commutes and because distance may limit a ﬁrm’s knowledge of such idiosyncratic
factors. Firms will pay eﬃciency wages to reduce shirking, but they will not know the exact
premium required to eliminate shirking by the worker or workers residing at a given location.
Presumably, ﬁrms will increase wages until the beneﬁt of reducing the likelihood of shirking
for a worker or workers equals the cost of the wage increase. Some workers are likely to shirk
in equilibrium because their commute is substantially longer than the ﬁrm’s estimate of their
commute, e.g. they have a commute time draw that occurs with very low probability and
so ﬁrms would not rationally raise wages to eliminate shirking under such a low probability
event. As the noise in commutes increases at longer distances, the required increase in wages
to eliminate a certain amount of shirking at a location increases, and ﬁrms rationally do
not eliminate as much shirking (pushing wages up above the level paid to workers who live
closer dw/dx > 0, but leaving shirking levels higher for larger values of x). Therefore, in the
intermediate case, both the employment and wage conditions implied by propositions 3 and
4 should hold in equilibrium.19
3E m p i r i c a l s t r a t e g y
The theoretical models above suggest an empirical relationship between commuting time and
either job separation and/or wages. While the model only provides an unambiguous predic-
tion concerning the sign of these relationships under a speciﬁc set of assumptions and other
models might generate similar relationships, the model above does suggest that if eﬃciency
wages are going to play an important role in the spatial distribution of unemployment or
wages this role should be directly related to the commutes faced by workers (since, assuming
(2), commutes and thus leisure have a positive impact on eﬀort and thus shirking). Further,
19A second intermediate scenario, which allows commute time to be observed albeit at some cost, might
arise because some ﬁrms wage discriminate based on workers’ commutes eliminating all shirking and others
simply pay a uniform eﬃciency wage to all workers possibly because the cost of monitoring commute time
varies across ﬁrms. This scenario should also lead to a situation where both unemployment and wages
increase systematically with distance, but the exact equilibrium conﬁguration is complicated by the fact
that ﬁrms that pay commute speciﬁce ﬃciency wages face an adverse selection problem because workers
with a long commute and therefore a high likelihood of shirking are attracted to the ﬁrms that will pay them
the high wages that prevent shirking.
15we would expect these relationships to be strongest for individuals who are likely to be paid
eﬃciency wages as an alternative to costly supervision. The tests oﬀered in this paper can
be viewed as necessary conditions, as opposed to suﬃcient, for eﬃciency wages to be impor-
tant in the spatial distribution of labor market outcomes. Moreover, a ﬁnding that one of
the variables, unemployment or earnings, are related to commutes, but not the other would
provide evidence favoring the model where ﬁrms cannot or can discriminate over space when
setting wages.
The direct inclusion of commute time in an employment or wage model results in a num-
ber of important biases. First, households choose their residential location in part based on
demand for housing and neighborhood attributes, which is heavily inﬂuenced by the per-
manent incomes of the household members. Accordingly, unobservables that aﬀect location
choice are likely to be correlated with labor market outcomes. In addition, commute time is
usually measured with signiﬁcant error and is usually unobserved for unemployed individuals
leading to measure error and selection bias, respectively. A standard solution for these biases
is to estimate the eﬀect of commute time using an instrumental variables speciﬁcation, which
requires that the eﬀect of commuting time be identiﬁed by exclusion of some factor that can
explain commuting time diﬀerences from the labor market equation
Cutler and Glaeser (1997) argue that an appropriate solution to the bias caused by
sorting over residential location is to aggregate up to a level at which sorting is less likely
to be endogenous, and they recommend identifying the eﬀect of location on outcomes using
across metropolitan variation. This approach has been used in a variety of applications
including Evans, Oates, and Schwab (1992) on neighborhood poverty, Cutler and Glaeser
(1997) on residential segregation, Ross (1998) and Weinberg (2000) on the spatial mismatch
hypothesis, Hoxby (2000) on school competition, and Card and Rothstein (2005) on the
black-white test score gap. In all of these papers, a cross-sectional analysis is conducted in
which across metropolitan variation in a key variable, such as rivers, number of jurisdictions,
or job decentralization, is used to identify the impact of location after controlling for other
important metropolitan level variables.20
We extend this approach by considering a broader source of variation for identiﬁcation.
Speciﬁcally, we recognize that a metropolitan area presents households with a complex set of
location options and that the expected location attributes arising from this choice set is likely
to vary systematically across individuals. For example, the limitations in choice created by
a racially segregated metropolitan area likely vary between college and high school educated
20For more general discussions of identiﬁcation in neighborhood eﬀect models, see Moﬃtt (2000), Bayer,
Ross and Topa (2005), Durlauf (2004), and Bayer and Ross (2006).
16African-Americans. We estimate a model of an individual’s commute time (Zils)21 and other
location attributes based on a speciﬁc set of individual attributes (Wils) and the individual’s
metropolitan area of residence. Speciﬁcally,
Zils = βsWils + εils (26)
where βs describes a relationship between the individual attributes and commute time that
is unique to metropolitan area s. Labor market outcomes (Yils) are modeled as function of
predicted commute time from equation (26), a broader set of individual attributes, Xils and
Wils,a sw e l la sm e t r o p o l i t a na r e aﬁxed eﬀects, or
Yils = γXils + ζWils + δE[Zils|Wils, ˆ βs]+αs + μils (27)
In this speciﬁcation, no individual variables are excluded from the second stage. Rather,
identiﬁcation is accomplished by the restriction that the relationship between Wils and Yils
does not vary systematically across metropolitan areas, which is similar to the identiﬁca-
tion strategy in housing price hedonics where the price function varies across markets and
preferences are restricted to be the same across markets (Epple, 1987). Speciﬁcally, across
individual diﬀerences in Wils do not provide any information to identify δ. Rather, across
metropolitan area diﬀerences in the estimated values of βs create diﬀerences in expected
commutes for observationally equivalent individuals who reside in diﬀerent metropolitan ar-
eas. A second and related feature of this model is that some variables are intentionally
omitted from the ﬁrst stage model for Zils. The impact of some individual attributes on Yils
may vary across metropolitan areas or may be endogenous to across metropolitan diﬀerences
in outcomes. A straightforward solution to this problem is simply to allow the coeﬃcients
on those variables to vary across metropolitan areas in the second stage equation, as well.
This approach, however, may lead to very complex models and in the interest of parsimony
it may be preferable to simply omit those variables from the ﬁrst stage so that identiﬁcation
cannot arise from that speciﬁc set of variables.
Finally, unlike the across metropolitan papers cited earlier, the identiﬁcation strategy in
this paper generates substantially more information allowing for the inclusion of multiple
location variables and metropolitan area ﬁxed eﬀects. These additional controls mitigate
concerns that the estimated eﬀect of commutes on labor market outcomes is biased by the
omission of important location or metropolitan area controls. In contrast to earlier papers,
which examine the impact of one variable on all individuals in the metropolitan area, this
21The subscripts i, l and s refer respectively to the individual, his/her location and the metropolitan area
where he/she lives.
17model allows the expected value of Zils to vary across households in the same metropolitan
area generating within metropolitan variation in the variable of interest. This additional
source of variation allows for identiﬁcation of coeﬃcients on multiple location variables, as
well as for the inclusion of metropolitan area ﬁxed eﬀects.
The speciﬁci d e n t i ﬁcation assumption used in this paper is that the spatial distribution of
the housing stock has an impact of commutes and other location variables that vary across
metropolitan areas, but that the housing stock variables only enter an individual’s labor
market equation for the sample as a whole. Speciﬁcally, commute time, as well as individual
exposure to good employment access, high income households and other location attributes,
is regressed on a set of housing variables representing the individual’s housing consumption.
An individual’s location variables are predicted based on the type of housing unit in which
they reside, and the spatial distribution of housing units across the metropolitan area creates
variation in exposure to these location variables. While the housing stock variables are
not expected to have a causal impact on labor market outcomes, they are included in the
second stage model along with standard demographic controls for labor market models in
order to assure that the coeﬃcients on the location variables are only identiﬁed based on
across metropolitan area variation. As discussed earlier, only systematic across metropolitan
diﬀerences in the relationship between housing stock and commutes are used to identify the
impact of commutes on employment outcomes. Across household diﬀerences in the housing
stock selected are captured by the direct inclusion of housing controls into the labor market
model.
4D a t a a n d r e s u l t s
The Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS) of the 2000 Decennial Census is used to examine
this question empirically because this sample records individuals’ labor market outcomes,
commutes, detailed individual attributes including industry and occupation, a reasonable set
of housing attributes, and identiﬁes each individual’s residential and employment location
to be within a speciﬁc spatial zone consisting of 100,000 individuals or more, Public Use
Microdata Areas (PUMA’s). A sample of 30 metropolitan areas are selected that have at
least 5 residential PUMA’s and 3 workplace PUMA’s or at least 4 residential and 4 workplace
PUMA’s (at least 15 residential to workplace PUMA combinations). For our employment
analysis, we draw a sample of all prime-age males (ages 25 to 55) who were either employed
the week prior to the census survey or describe themselves as actively seeking work during
that period (labor force participants), who do not reside in groups quarters, leading to a
18sample of 1,127,607 workers. The wage rate is calculated as simply annual 1999 earnings
divided by the product of typical hours worked per week last year times the number of weeks
worked last year. The model to explain the logarithm of wages is estimated for all workers
who worked at least 40 weeks last year and at least 30 hours in a typical week and whose
estimated wage exceeded the federal minimum wage of $5.15 per hour leading to a sample
of 903,255 full-time workers.22
In order to test whether the relationship between commutes and labor market outcomes
are related to the operation of eﬃciency wages, we divide workers into 12 major occupational
categories and classify those categories as lightly or heavily supervised.23 This supervision
classiﬁcation is based on an analysis by Levenson and Zoghi (2006). They order occupations
on a white collar-blue collar continuum with executives and managers at one end and un-
skilled laborers at the other, use data from the 1999 National Compensation Survey to plot
average supervision levels within occupations, and ﬁt these averages to a quartic trend line.24
The estimated trend line identiﬁes a clear break in the pattern of supervision with all major
occupation categories on the white collar side of a threshold having an predicted supervision
level between 0.62 and 0.66 and all categories on the blue collar side having a predicted
level between 0.34 and 0.45 on a scale between zero and one where one implies independence
from supervision. The sample is then split into sets of workers in high and low supervision
occupations with approximately 62.6 and 60.4 percent of workers in the employment and log
wage samples, respectively, in high supervision occupations.25
22Alternative models were estimated using a smaller sample of prime age male workers who report exactly
40 hours of work per week, and the empirical results are qualitatively similar. This sample restriction might
be more consistent with the assumption of ﬁxed work hours in the theoretical model, but was not used for
the analysis presented in the paper because that sample is much more highly selected than the sample of
worked 30 hours or more, prime age male workers.
23The twelve major categories are manager, engineer and scientist, education and other professionals,
Health professionals, Health support and protective services, food and personal services, sales, oﬃce, con-
struction, maintenance, production, and transportation.
24The 1999 National Compensation Survey (NCS) is a restricted use data set and is the ﬁrst nationally
representative survey to collect information on worker supervision since a 1977 supplement to the Panel
Survey of Income Dynamics used in Neal (1993). The authors do not have access to the NCS data, and the
U.S. Department of Labor has not published any descriptive statistics or tabular information on supervision
from the survey.
25The reader should note that the resulting estimates after splitting the sample by whether the individual’s
occupation is highly supervised or not are quite robust over a variety of model speciﬁcation not shown
in the paper; including models based on the dependent variables earnings and whether employed rather
than the wage and employment conditional on labor force particiation that are used in this paper and
more relevant to our theoretical model. On the other hand, the estimated coeﬃcient on commute time
19An important question to address is whether we should expect to ﬁnd eﬃciency wages
operating in lightly or heavily supervised occupations. Occupations might have low levels
of supervision because they pay eﬃciency wages and therefore workers do not require close
supervision. This fairly standard logic is consistent with the idea that it is hard to observe
the performance of white collar workers and so those workers must be paid eﬃciency wages
in order to assure that they do not shirk, while blue collar workers can prevented from shirk-
ing by intensive monitoring. On the other hand, occupations in which supervision is very
important and shirking a large problem may have high levels of supervision on average, but
there also may be many ﬁr m st h a th i r ew o r k e r si nt h o s eo c c u p a t i o n sa n dr e l yo np a y i n g
wages above marginal productivity in order to encourage eﬀort on the part of those work-
ers. Further, for high skill occupations with low supervision, ﬁrms may rely on alternative
methods for motivating workers and assuring high performance levels. For example, certain
high skill occupations may provide long term, tournament style rewards in terms of a steep
wage trajectory based on successful long term performance, which can be veriﬁed without
active monitoring of short or medium term performance. If so, occupations with this type
of wage structure would be unlikely to use extensive employee monitoring or pay eﬃciency
wages. It is notable that several recent eﬃciency wage studies, which ﬁnd strong evidence of
eﬃciency wages, have explicitly focused on workers involved in industrial production where
supervision is high and the workers studied are clearly blue collar workers.26
The employment and earnings model speciﬁcations will include commute time along with
a standard set of individual level control variables.27 The controls include age and square of
the worker’s age, educational attainment dummy variables going from high school graduate
to recipients of master’s degree or higher, race and ethnicity controls, marital status and
presence of children in the household, and whether born in U.S. and if not a control for time
residing in the U.S. The model also includes industry ﬁxed eﬀects and ﬁxed eﬀects for each
occupation-metropolitan area combination. The models are estimated separately for high
changes substantially and is not robust across diﬀerent speciﬁcations when the sample is pooled across all
occupations, presumably because the model that determines employment and wages varies across highly and
lightly supervised occupations.
26See for example Chen and Edin’s (2002) study of workers in the metalworking industries in Sweden,
Paarsh and Shearer’s (2000) study of workers at a tree planting ﬁrm in British Columbia, and Lazear’s
(2000) study of workers at the Safelite Glass Corporation in the United States.
27The model controls and instruments for the individual’s actual commute time. Alternative models were
estimated using average commute time between the individual’s PUMA of residence and PUMA of work.
The results with that variable are very similar to those presented in the paper. This suggests that individual
idiosyncrasies in mode choice do not drive our results, but systematic diﬀerences in mode choice across
residential locations may play a role in the relationship between commute times and labor market outcomes.
20and low supervision occupations using instrumental variable analysis where an instrument for
commute time is developed by estimating metropolitan speciﬁcm o d e l so fi n d i v i d u a lc o m m u t e
times as a function of the individual’s housing attributes. The means and standard errors of
all variables are shown separately for workers in highly and lightly supervised occupations
in Table 1. Workers in occupations that are highly supervised have slightly lower rates of
employment, lower earnings, substantially less education, and have greater representation of
minority and immigrant groups. As designed, the occupational split in the sample accurately
distinguishes between white collar workers who tend to operate more independently and
blue/pink collar workers who tend to be subject to more direct supervision.
[Insert Table 1 here]
The employment model is estimated using a linear probability model where observations
are deleted interatively whenever predicted probabilities from the estimated model fall above
one or below zero. Horace and Oaxaca (2003) show that this iterative approach provides
consistent estimates for binary dependent variable problems.28 The wage model is estimated
using standard ordinary least squares where the dependent variable is the logarithm of earn-
ings. In both cases, a two stage approach is used where the predicted value of commute time
and potentially other location attributes are included directly in the employment and wage
equations. The housing variables used to instrument for commute time and other location
attributes include number of bedrooms, number of other rooms, age of structure, number of
units in structure, lot size, owner-occupancy, non-owner-occupant without cash rent, condo-
minium, mobile home, incomplete kitchen facilities, and incomplete plumbing.29 All standard
errors are clustered at the occupation-metropolitan area level in order to address the concern
that standard errors might be biased due to heteroscedasticity across occupations within a
speciﬁc metropolitan area or across metropolitan areas for the same occupation.
Table 2 presents the results for the employment estimations. The estimates of the stan-
dard demographic controls are as expected with higher levels of education leading to higher
employment levels, family structure inﬂuencing employment in the standard manner, mi-
nority groups having lower levels of employment, and immigrants having higher levels of
employment. The estimates diﬀe rb e t w e e nt h et w oo c c u p a t i o ng r o u p sw i t ht h ei m p a c to f
race, family structure, and immigrant having substantially less inﬂuence on employment
for the low supervision/white collar occupations. In terms of commutes, workers in high
28The estimation of employment models using a logit yields qualitatively similar results.
29The housing variables number of bedrooms, number of other rooms, age of structure, number of units
in structure, and lot size are all represented by a series of dummy variables representing speciﬁcn u m b e r so f
rooms or ranges for age, number of units, and lot size.
21supervision occupations/blue collar workers have a negative relationship between commute
and employment with a one hour increase in commute reducing employment rates by 2.4
percentage points. An increase in commutes reduces the time endowment of these workers
and appears to increase the likelihood of unemployment potentially because the likelihood
of shirking has risen for these workers. This ﬁnding is consistent with our assumption (2)
of a positive cross-partial derivative of utility with respect to eﬀort and leisure, or intu-
itively substitutability between leisure time and shirking. The coeﬃcient on commutes for
low supervision/white collar workers is near zero. It also is notable that the inclusion of
and instrumenting for commute time has no impact on the parameter estimates for the
demographic controls.
[Insert Table 2 here]
Table 3 presents the results for the wage estimations. The estimates are similar to
the estimates for the employment model with the estimates on the demographic variables
following standard patterns for labor market models. As before, the estimated impact of
family structure and being an immigrant are substantially smaller for occupations with low
levels of supervision, and the estimates on demographic variables are unaﬀected by the
inclusion of and instrumenting for commute time. The eﬀect of commute for workers in
highly supervised occupations is consistent with eﬃciency wage based discrimination using
commute time where a one hour increase in commute leads to a 8.2 percent increase in wages.
The commute time eﬀect on wages also implies a positive cross-partial derivative between
eﬀort and leisure, which again corresponds to assumption (2). These ﬁndings are consistent
with incomplete commute based wage discrimination so that the unemployment eﬀect of
commutes through increased shirking remains and is captured by the estimations presented
in the ﬁrst column of Table 2.
O b s e r v et h a to u rr e s u l t sa r ei nl i n ew i t ho u re ﬃciency wage model and not with a standard
search approach. Indeed, theoretically, long distance search (presumably correlated with a
long expected commute) may lower the eﬀectiveness of search and raise the cost. These two
eﬀects combine to reduce the number/quality of oﬀers received and lower the reservation
wage yielding an ambiguous eﬀect on the likelihood of employment eﬀect. However, lower
quality oﬀers and lower reservation wages both should lead to lower wages on average for
people with long commutes. This theoretical prediction is the opposite of the empirical
ﬁndings in our model where we ﬁnd that long commutes lead to higher wages presumably
to reduce shirking.
[Insert Table 3 here]
22On the other hand, the estimations indicate a negative impact of commutes on wages for
workers in lightly supervised occupations, and while smaller in magnitude than the results
for highly supervised workers the estimate is statistically signiﬁcant at a 95 percent level of
conﬁdence. In principle, these results might be consistent with white collar workers having
a negative cross-partial derivative of utility with respect to eﬀort and leisure, and ﬁrms
being capable of perfect wage discrimination for white collar workers so that commutes have
no inﬂuence on employment for this group. However, we do not believe that such strong
conclusions are warranted. First, the negative result on commutes for lightly supervised
workers is not entirely robust, as will be seen in the next section.
Second, a more conservative interpretation of these results is as a test for diﬀerences
in the eﬀect of commutes on employment and wages between workers in lightly and highly
supervised occupations. In that context, we see that an hour increase in commute lowers
employment in highly supervised occupations relative to those in lightly supervised occupa-
tions by 2.2 percentage points, and raises wages in the highly supervised occupations by 13.7
percent relative to lightly supervised occupations. While this interpretation does not allow
us to sign the cross-partial derivative, the results provide strong evidence that commutes
aﬀect employment and wages diﬀerently based on the level of supervision in the occupation,
and the direction of the eﬀects on employment and wages are consistent with each other
given the theory developed earlier.
5R o b u s t n e s s c h e c k s
5.1 Omitted location attributes
This ﬁrst set of robustness tests involve the inclusion of additional controls for the impact
of residential location on neighborhood outcomes. For example, average commute time has
sometimes been used as a proxy for employment access in studies of the spatial mismatch
hypotheses. While the existing literature has established that commute time is a very poor
proxy for employment access,30 any correlation between commute time and employment ac-
cess may bias our analysis unless employment access is explicitly included in the model.
Similarly, the demographic composition of a worker’s residential location may both inﬂu-
ence labor market outcomes and be correlated with average commute times. Since workers
30In practice, the correlation between gravity based measures of employment access and mean commute
time is small. Furthermore, mean commute time is often insigniﬁcant in those studies while gravity based
measures are typically found to be signiﬁcant in the same or similar samples. See Ihlanfeldt and Sjoquist
(1998) for a survey of the spatial mismatch literature.
23select their residential locations and their likely commutes simultaneously, the instrumental
variables estimation strategy will be applied to commute time as well as all other location
variables.
Tables 4 and 5 present the results of series of analyses that included employment access,31
average family income, and neighborhood demographics into the employment and wage mod-
els, respectively. The inclusion of employment access into the model has no impact on the
estimated eﬀect of commutes on employment for occupations with supervision, but the inclu-
sion of average family income reduces the magnitude of the parameter estimate on commutes
by half and the commute time coeﬃcient is even smaller and statistically insigniﬁcant after
including the neighborhood demographic controls. On the other hand, Table 5 shows that
the positive eﬀects of commutes on the earnings of workers in occupations with high levels
of supervision are very robust to the inclusion of any and all additional location variables.
The ﬁnding of no employment eﬀect for commutes for occupations without supervision is
robust (Table 4 second panel), and the small negative earnings eﬀect of commutes for oc-
cupations without supervision disappears after controlling for employment access (Table 5
second panel) bringing the employment and earnings estimates in line with each other for
this group of workers.
[Insert Tables 4 and 5 here]
One possible explanation for the decline in the magnitude of the commute time coeﬃcient
is that the instrumental variables do not contain suﬃcient variation to identify the coeﬃcients
for so many endogenous regressors. This problem is analogous to the weak instrument
problem for the single variable instrumental variables model. The standard rules of thumb
for determining whether instruments are weak are well developed for the single endogenous
variable case, but are not well deﬁned for more complex models. However, a widely accepted
feature of IV estimations based on weak instruments is that the IV estimates are biased
towards the OLS estimates (Bound, Jaeger, and Baker, 1995; Zivot, Startz, and Nelson,
31The measure of employment access is created by estimating a traditional gravity model based on com-
muting ﬂows between residential and workplace PUMA’s. Speciﬁcally, the ﬂow of commuters between each
residential and workplace PUMA is regressed upon the number of prime age adults residing in the PUMA,
the number of employed adults working in the PUMA, and the mean travel time between the residential and
workplace PUMA using a log-log speciﬁcation. The employment access measure is based on weighted expo-
nential average of zone employment totals, where the parameter estimates and the commute times between
a tract and each zone are used to create the weighting scheme. The employment access variable is then
standardized so that the estimated coeﬃcient represents the inﬂuence of a one standard deviation improve-
ment in employment access. See O’Regan and Quigley (1996) for details on gravity based and alternative
employment access.
241998).
In this spirit, we re-estimate all four models in Table 4 for workers in highly supervised
occupations and ﬁnd that the OLS estimates on commute time are near zero for all models.
This ﬁnding is consistent with the hypothesis that the commute time estimates in the top
panel of Table 4 are trending towards zero as more endogenous regressors are added due to
a weak instruments bias. As a further test, we estimate a model that includes all location
controls, but only instruments for commute time. In this model, the commute time estimates
are statistically signiﬁcant and close to the IV estimates in the ﬁrst two columns. For
example, for the full speciﬁcation shown in the last column of Table 4, we ﬁnd that the
O L Se s t i m a t ef o rc o m m u t et i m ei s0 . 0 0 1 ,b u tt h eI Ve s t i m a t ef o rc o m m u t et i m ew h e nt h e
weak instrument problem is avoided by using the actual value for other location controls is
-0.018, which is smaller than, but close to the estimates in the ﬁrst two columns of Table 4.
T h er e a d e rs h o u l da l s on o t et h a tt h eO L Se s t i m a t ef o rc o m m u t et i m eo nw a g e sf o rw o r k e r s
in highly supervised occupations is 0.024 or near zero diﬀering substantially from the IV
estimates in Table 5 and suggesting that the wage models do not suﬀer from a serious weak
instruments problem. Further, replacing the predicted value of all other location controls
with actual values and continuing to instrument for commute time yielded estimates of 0.130,
w h i c ha r ev e r ys i m i l a rt ot h eI Ve s t i m a t e si nt h et o pp a n e lo ft h el a s tc o l u m ni nT a b l e5 .
5.2 Exogeneity of instruments
A second concern arises from the possible endogeneity of the instruments. The most im-
portant control for limiting the bias from endogeneity is the inclusion of the housing stock
variables in the labor market models. These controls assure that the estimates on commute
time and other location variables are only identiﬁed based on across metropolitan diﬀerences
in the distribution of households across each metropolitan area’s housing stock. However, the
identifying across metropolitan variation still might be endogenous to employment outcomes.
For example, the unobservable, average human capital diﬀerences between owner-occupants
of traditional single-family housing may diﬀer systematically across metropolitan areas due
to diﬀerences in market conditions.32
In order to address this concern, we identify a subset of the housing stock variables, which
we believe are most likely to be correlated with unobserved determinants of labor market out-
comes, and re-estimate the IV model excluding those variables. Intuitively, this robustness
32See Deng, Ross and Wachter (2003) for evidence of a simulteneity between homeownership and residential
location choice.
25check is analogous to an over-identiﬁcation test where if the excluded instrumental variables
are correlated with unobservables in the second stage labor market equation its exclusion
from the ﬁrst and second stage in this analysis should change the estimated coeﬃcient on
the commute time variable. For our application, variables that relate to owner-occupancy
(owner-occupancy, non-owner-occupant without cash rent, condominium, mobile home) and
variables that suggest that the housing might be substandard (incomplete kitchen facilities
and incomplete plumbing) are deleted from both the ﬁrst and second stage models under the
assumption that across metropolitan diﬀerences in the spatial distribution of owner-occupied
housing and substandard housing is less clearly exogenous than the spatial distribution of
physical space variables, such as number of rooms or lot size.
Tables 6 and 7 provide the results for these analyses. The results are very robust the
elimination of the owner-occupancy and the substandard housing variables has no mean-
ingful impact on the point estimates for any of the speciﬁcations considered in either the
employment or wage models. The ﬁndings presented in this paper appear to be quite robust
to the choice of instruments.
[Insert Tables 6 and 7 here]
5.3 Role of education
Finally, the low supervision occupation workers have much more education on average than
the high supervision workers, with 37.7 percent of the low supervision sample having a
four year college degree compared to only 13.0% of the high supervision sample. Given the
important human capital diﬀerences between the low and high supervision occupations, we
interact education with commute time in order to see whether the supervision level diﬀerences
in the eﬀect of commutes are simply attributable to diﬀerences in the education level of the
workers in the two sample. If education diﬀerences are truly responsible for our ﬁndings,
the interaction of commute time with education level should eliminate the supervision level
diﬀerences in the eﬀect of commute time on labor market outcomes, and this extended model
should simply ﬁnd education diﬀerences in the eﬀect of commutes for both samples. While
we ﬁnd that the inﬂuence of commute time on labor market outcomes varies by education
level, the inclusion of this interaction does not eliminate diﬀerences in the eﬀect of commutes
across the supervision level samples. As in previous analyses, the primary eﬀects of commute
are identiﬁed for the high supervision occupation sample even after allowing these eﬀect to
vary by education level.
Table 8 and 9 provide the results for the employment and wage models, respectively.
26I nt h eb a s e l i n ee m p l o y m e n ta n a l y s i s ,t h en e g a t i v ee ﬀect of commute time for non-college
educated workers in high supervision occupations is approximately the same magnitude as
the eﬀect for all high supervision occupation workers in Table 6, and the commute time eﬀect
for non-college educated workers in low supervision occupations is zero. The negative eﬀect
of commute time increases for college educated workers in both samples, but the education
eﬀect is signiﬁcantly larger for high supervision occupation workers. As in Tables 4 and 6,
the diﬀerences between the estimates for the high and low supervision occupation samples
disappear as we add controls for neighborhood income and demographic composition, which
appears to be consistent with a weak instrument problem that is biasing the IV estimates
towards OLS estimates. In all of the wage analyses (Table 9), the eﬀect of commute time for
non-college educated workers in high supervision occupations is about half the magnitude
of eﬀect for all high supervision occupation workers in Table 6, and the eﬀect of commute
time for high supervision workers who are college educated is much larger, between two
and a half and four times the estimated eﬀect in Table 6. However, as before, there is no
relationship between commute time and wages for workers in highly supervised occupations
regardless of education level. While this analysis ﬁnds evidence that education matters in the
relationship between commute time and labor market outcomes, the analysis still strongly
supports the idea that this relationship arises primarily for workers in high supervision
occupations especially in the case of the wage estimates.
[Insert Tables 8 and 9 here]
6 Summary and conclusions
This paper extends the classic model of eﬃciency wages to allow for substitution between
shirking and leisure. This model is set within an urban equilibrium. The paper shows that
aw o r k e r ’ sb e n e ﬁt from shirking will depend upon their time endowment net of commuting
time and that some workers will shirk in equilibrium unless ﬁrms can set eﬃciency wages
based on each worker’s commute. The model implies an empirical relationship between
commutes and either employment and/or wages.
The paper uses data from the Public Use Microdata Sample of the 2000 U.S. Decennial
Census to investigate whether the empirical implications of our eﬃciency wage-substitution
model hold. The sample contains detailed information on residential and employment loca-
tion, as well as standard demographic data including a worker’s industry and occupation,
labor market outcomes, and commuting patterns. A variety of models are estimated to ex-
amine whether a household’s predicted commute time inﬂuences employment or labor market
27earnings. The analyses ﬁnd evidence to suggest that longer commutes lead to lower levels
of employment among workers in highly supervised occupations presumably because these
are occupations where shirking can have a large impact on ﬁrm productivity. The ﬁndings
suggest that leisure and shirking are substitutable so that an increase in commutes reduces
an individual’s net time endowment leading to lower levels of leisure and higher levels of
shirking.
The analysis also ﬁnds a strong positive relationship between wages and predicted com-
mute for highly supervised workers. These results support the hypothesis that ﬁrms can
wage discriminate based on commutes reducing the amount of shirking by workers with long
commutes. However, the wage discrimination/spatially based eﬃciency wage is incomplete
allowing for a relationship between commutes in employment for workers in heavily super-
vised occupation. It is notable that the employment and wage results for highly supervised
workers are consistent in that long commutes lead to a higher tendency for workers to shirk,
which predicts higher unemployment and/or the paying of higher wages to prevent shirking.
For lightly supervised workers, no robust evidence exists of a relationship between commutes
and either employment or wages.
The estimates from models that interact education level and commute time indicate that
the eﬀect of commutes is larger for college educated workers. As before, the inﬂuence of
college education on the estimated eﬀect of commute time occurs primarily for the sample
of workers in high supervision occupations. For the high supervision sample, the inﬂuence
of commute time on employment for college educated workers is approximately double the
estimated eﬀect for non-college educated workers, while the inﬂuence of commute time on
employment for college educated workers is between four and six times the eﬀect for non-
college educated workers. As in the earlier analyses, the evidence that commute matters for
workers in the low supervision sample is much weaker, especially in the wage models.
A substantial, growing literature exists on the operation of eﬃciency wage models in
urban economies (see e.g. Zenou and Smith, 1995; Smith and Zenou, 1997; Zenou, 2002;
Brueckner and Zenou 2003; Zenou, 2006), and prior to this paper no empirical evidence has
been oﬀered to suggest that eﬃciency wages are important in explaining diﬀerences in labor
market outcomes over space. This paper oﬀers a ﬁrst attempt to test for the inﬂuence of
eﬃciency wages on urban outcomes and ﬁnds strong evidence to support the relevance of
this theory. Additional empirical work is needed investigating the role that eﬃciency wages
or other models of unemployment can play in explaining spatial variation in employment
and earnings.
In addition, the model and ﬁndings presented in this paper have broader implications
28for the eﬃciency wage literature. Traditional eﬃciency wage models suggest that ﬁrms can
prevent shirking by paying eﬃciency wages, but this paper suggests a mechanism by which
workers will diﬀer in their likelihood of shirking even if their underlying preferences are the
same. Speciﬁcally, workers that have a lower net endowment of time prior to making a work
eﬀort decision, either due to a longer commute or non-work related personal obligations, such
as a disabled spouse, child, or parent, are likely to diﬀer in their propensity to shirk. Accord-
ingly, if ﬁrms are unable to perfectly distinguish between workers in diﬀerent circumstances,
they will rationally set wages so that some workers shirk in equilibrium. The evidence found
in this paper is consistent with this form of equilibrium shirking.
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Using Proposition 2, the result is straightforward.
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Now by combining these two equations, we obtain the following equation that determines
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(e − e)[(1− e xno)(1 − uS)2 + e xno(1 − uNS)2]
(30)
where Lno =( 1− e xno)(1−uS)+e xno(1−uNS), whereas the employment level in each ﬁrm is
determined by (29).
We would like now to show that ∂2Πno/∂w2
no < 0.B yD i ﬀerentiating (28) with respect






































Assume that (2) holds. Then, from Proposition 2, we know that ∂e xno/∂wno > 0.U s i n g















































35Finally, using Lemma 1 and assuming (14) imply that ∂2e xno/∂w2




















Deﬁnition of equilibrium when ﬁrms do not observe workers’ location
Deﬁnition 1 C o n s i d e rt h ec a s ew h e nﬁrms do not observe workers’ location. Assume (2)
and (14). Then, the equilibrium (Ino,e xno,w no,α no,M no,u NS,u S)s u c ht h a t
Ψ
S(1,Ino)=0 (31)
(12), (28), (29), (17), (8), and (9) hold.
The conditions of the land market equilibrium are given by (12) and (31). These con-
ditions guarantee that the equilibrium land rent has to be continuous over all the city, i.e.
l a n dr e n t so fs h i r k e r sa n dn o n s h i r k e r sh a v et ob ee q u a la tt h ei n t e r s e c t i o nl o c a t i o ne x and the
land rent at the city fringe has to be equal to the agricultural land rent (here normalized to
zero). Conditions of the labor market equilibrium are given by the ﬁve other equations. An
equilibrium requires solving simultaneously these two equilibria.
Deﬁnition of equilibrium when ﬁrms do observe workers’ location
We focus on a symmetric labor market equilibrium in which each ﬁrm employs the same





Deﬁnition 2 Consider the case when ﬁrms can wage discriminate in terms of location.
Assume (22). Then, the equilibrium is a vector (wo(x),α o,M o,u NS,u S,Io) such that (21),
(24), (29), (32), (8), (9) and (20) hold.
36Table 1:  Means and Standard Errors 





Employment  0.954 (0.21)  0.981 (0.14) 
Adult’s Housing Wage  17.480 (15.71)  29.531 (26.42) 
Years in Labor Market  2.009 (0.86)  18.322 (8.585) 
Adult has Masters Degree or More  0.031 (0.17)  0.300 (0.46) 
Adult is College Graduate  0.130 (0.34)  0.377 (0.48) 
Adult has Two Years of College  0.069 (0.25)  0.070 (0.25) 
Adult is High School Graduate  0.575 (0.49)  0.233 (0.42) 
Adult is Hispanic  0.178 (0.38)  0.055 (0.23) 
Adult is African-American  0.126 (0.33)  0.068 (0.25) 
Adult is Asian or Pacific Islander  0.049 (0.22)  0.084 (0.28) 
Adult is Native American  0.005 (0.07)  0.003 (0.05) 
Adult is Another Race  0.120 (0.33)  0.040 (0.20) 
Household Contains Children  0.503 (0.50)  0.520 (0.50) 
Adult is Married  0.624 (0.48)  0.699 (0.46) 
Non-Native Adult Residing <= 10 years  0.084 (0.28)  0.062 (0.24) 
Non-Native Adult Residing > 10 years  0.158 (0.36)  0.118 (0.32) 
Commuting Time in Hours  0.492 (0.349)  0.512 (0.347) 
Standardized Employment Access  -0.053 (0.989)  0.083 (1.021) 
Mean Family Income in $1,000’s  78.148 (24.376)  87.295 (26.276) 
Fraction African-American  0.133 (0.178)  0.104 (0.142) 
Fraction Hispanic  0.149 (0.178)  0.112 (0.127) 
Fraction Non-Naïve  0.225 (0.192)  0.213 (0.159) 
Sample Size  706,296 421,311 
 Notes:  The sample includes all males aged 25 to 55 who are currently participating in the labor market and not 
residing in group quarters.  Standard errors are shown in parentheses.   The first column is based on all individuals 
who report an occupation which belongs to a general occupation categories classified as having high levels of 
supervision.  The next column is based on a sample containing individuals in all other occupations.  Average wage is 
based on a smaller sample restricted to individuals working at least 40 weeks, an average of at least 30 hours per 
week, and with estimated hourly earnings at the Federal minimum wage or higher.  The wage rate sample size for 
occupations with supervision is 545,727 and for occupations without supervision is 357,528.  Commute times are only 
reported for individuals who are employed at the time of the survey.  The respective sample sizes for the commute time mean and 
standard deviation are 648,816 and 394,391.  
  
Table 2:  Parameter Estimates and T-Statistics for Employment Models 
Occupations with Supervision  Occupations without Supervision  Variable Names 
OLS IV OLS  IV 
Years in Labor Market / 10  -0.002 (1.19)  -0.002 (1.24)  -0.010 (6.85)  -0.010 (6.85) 
Square Years in Labor Market / 10  0.001 (1.97)  0.001 (2.04)  0.001 (3.09)  0.001 (3.09) 
Adult has Masters Degree or More  0.033 (17.13)  0.033 (16.92)  0.034 (9.09)  0.034 (9.09) 
Adult is College Graduate  0.043 (24.55)  0.043 (24.10)  0.029 (8.35)  0.029 (8.36) 
Adult has Two Years of College  0.037 (21.04)  0.038 (20.98)  0.026 (7.38)  0.026 (7.38) 
Adult is High School Graduate  0.027 (19.38)  0.027 (19.30)  0.021 (6.93)  0.021 (6.93) 
Adult is Hispanic  -0.002 (1.12)  -0.001 (1.01)  -0.005 (2.51)  -0.005 (2.51) 
Adult is African-American  -0.047 (23.80)  -0.047 (23.64)  -0.016 (13.12)  -0.016 (13.10) 
Adult is Asian or Pacific Islander  -0.015 (8.83)  -0.015 (8.76)  -0.004 (2.97)  -0.004 (2.98) 
Adult is Native American  -0.029 (5.68)  -0.029 (5.70)  -0.012 (2.28)  -0.012 (2.28) 
Adult is Another Race  -0.005 (3.82)  -0.005 (3.77)  -0.002 (1.28)  -0.002 (1.29) 
Household Contains Children  0.009 (13.28)  0.009 (13.34)  0.007 (10.51)  0.007 (10.56) 
Adult is Married  0.026 (28.33)  0.026 (28.21)  0.012 (16.91)  0.012 (16.90) 
Non-Native Residing <= 10 years  0.017 (9.06)  0.017 (9.10)  -0.004 (4.04)  -0.004 (4.01) 
Non-Native Residing > 10 years  0.008 (6.03)  0.008 (6.13)  -0.002 (2.43)  -0.002 (2.44) 
Commute Time    -0.024 (4.06)    -0.002 (0.42) 
Sample Size  653,624 650,133 392,917  391,966 
Notes:   The models are estimated using a sample of labor force participants and a linear probability model 
iteratively in order to eliminate observations that predict residuals outside of the zero-one interval.  All models 
control for industry and Occupation-MSA fixed effects, as well as controls for the housing attributes that are used to 
predict exposure to residential location attributes.  All standard errors are clustered at the Occupation-MSA level in 
order to address heteroscedasticity that might arise in the fixed effects specification.  T-statistics are shown in 
parentheses.    
Table 3:  Parameter Estimates and T-Statistics for Log Wage Models 
Occupations with Supervision  Occupations without Supervision  Variable Names 
OLS IV  OLS  IV 
Years in Labor Market / 10  0.202  (31.50)  0.202  (31.46)  0.349  (34.83)  0.349  (34.82) 
Square Years in Labor Market / 10  -0.031  (17.96)  -0.031  (17.92)  -0.055  (21.37)  -0.055  (21.37) 
Adult has Masters Degree or More  0.471  (25.05)  0.471  (25.10)  0.565  (37.52)  0.565  (37.56) 
Adult is College Graduate  0.374  (34.82)  0.374  (34.82)  0.429  (31.15)  0.429  (31.16) 
Adult has Two Years of College  0.199  (25.19)  0.199  (25.22)  0.197  (16.06)  0.197  (16.05) 
Adult is High School Graduate  0.136  (22.54)  0.136  (22.55)  0.154  (13.88)  0.154  (13.89) 
Adult is Hispanic  -0.091  (12.91)  -0.092  (12.96)  -0.088  (8.73)  -0.088  (8.73) 
Adult is African-American  -0.094  (15.63)  -0.094  (15.66)  -0.142  (16.19)  -0.142  (16.20) 
Adult is Asian or Pacific Islander  -0.130  (10.24)  -0.131  (10.25)  -0.060  (3.80)  -0.060  (3.81) 
Adult is Native American  -0.086  (8.89)  -0.086  (8.87)  -0.124  (8.48)  -0.124  (8.48) 
Adult is Another Race  -0.046  (7.64)  -0.046  (7.65)  -0.086  (9.43)  -0.086  (9.45) 
Household Contains Children  0.043  (20.20)  0.043  (20.17)  0.013  (3.55)  0.013  (3.57) 
Adult is Married  0.083  (30.11)  0.083  (30.16)  0.057  (9.76)  0.058  (9.79) 
Non-Native Residing <= 10 years  -0.186  (21.04)  -0.186  (21.04)  0.003  (0.25)  0.003  (0.25) 
Non-Native Residing > 10 years  -0.084  (15.08)  -0.084  (15.18)  -0.028  (3.72)  -0.028  (3.71) 
Commute Time    0.082  (3.70)    -0.052  (1.99) 
R-Square  0.318 0.318  0.293  0.293 
Sample Size  545,727 357,528 
Notes:   The models are estimated by applying two stage least squares to a sample of individuals working at least 40 
weeks, an average of at least 30 hours per week, and with estimated hourly earnings at the Federal minimum wage 
or higher.  All models control for industry and Occupation-MSA fixed effects, as well as housing attribute controls.  
All standard errors are clustered at the Occupation-MSA level, and T-statistics are shown in parentheses.    
Table 4:  Parameter Estimates and T-Statistics for Employment Models
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Occupations with Supervision 
Commute Time  -0.024 (4.06)  -0.023 (3.48)  -0.011 (1.96)  -0.005 (0.87) 
Employment Access     0.001 (0.38)  0.000 (0.05)  0.004 (2.39) 
Mean Family Income / $100,000      0.053 (7.08)  0.026 (3.27) 
Fraction African-American      -0.062  (5.55) 
Fraction Hispanic      -0.091  (4.89) 
Fraction Non-Native      0.062  (3.59) 
Sample Size  650,133  650,367 649,898  641,599 
Occupations without Supervision 
Commute Time  -0.002 (0.42)  0.001 (0.17)  -0.001 (0.13)  0.002 (0.38) 
Employment Access     0.001 (1.16)  0.000 (0.40)  0.001 (0.45) 
Mean Family Income / $100,000      0.018 (2.99)  0.008 (1.22) 
Fraction African-American        -0.009 (0.92) 
Fraction Hispanic      0.006 (0.37) 
Fraction Non-Native      -0.034 (1.93) 
Sample Size  391,966 392,004 392,149  383,328 
Notes:   The models are estimated using an iterative linear probability model.  All models control for the 
demographic attributes shown in Tables 2 and 3 plus housing attributes, industry and Occupation-MSA fixed effects.  
All standard errors are clustered at the Occupation-MSA level, and T-statistics are shown in parentheses.   Table 5:  Parameter Estimates and T-Statistics for Log Wage Models
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Occupations with Supervision 
Commute Time  0.082  (3.70)  0.109  (3.07)  0.137  (3.70)  0.122  (3.00) 
Employment Access     0.016  (1.15)  0.013  (0.91)  0.014  (1.14) 
Mean Family Income / $100,000      0.140  (3.65)  0.189  (4.81) 
Fraction African-American      0.069    (1.53) 
Fraction Hispanic      -0.144    (1.06) 
Fraction Non-Native      0.209    (1.50) 
R-Square  0.318  0.318 0.318  0.318 
Sample Size  545,727 
Occupations without Supervision 
Commute Time  -0.052  (1.99)  0.014  (0.42)  0.005  (0.15)  -0.006  (0.17) 
Employment Access     0.030  (2.49)  0.022  (1.98)  0.023  (2.03) 
Mean Family Income / $100,000      0.142  (2.18)  0.202  (3.27) 
Fraction African-American        -0.091  (0.94) 
Fraction Hispanic      0.272  (1.32) 
Fraction Non-Native      0.043  (0.25) 
R-Square  0.293 0.293 0.293  0.294 
Sample Size  357,528 
Notes:   The models are estimated using two stage least squares.  All models control for the demographic attributes 
shown in Tables 2 and 3 plus housing attributes, industry and Occupation-MSA fixed effects.  All standard errors 
are clustered at the Occupation-MSA level, and T-statistics are shown in parentheses.  Table 6:  Employment Models with Smaller Set of Instruments
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Occupations with Supervision 
Commute Time  -0.027 (4.57)  -0.025 (3.68)  -0.014 (2.39)  -0.008 (1.43) 
Employment Access     0.001 (0.79)  0.001 (0.46)  0.005 (3.13) 
Mean Family Income / $100,000      0.045 (5.76)  0.020 (2.37) 
Fraction African-American      -0.055  (4.72) 
Fraction Hispanic      -0.100  (5.34) 
Fraction Non-Native      0.071  (4.09) 
Sample Size  653,086 653,361 652,838  644,995 
Occupations without Supervision 
Commute Time  -0.002 (0.46)  0.002 (0.33)  0.000 (0.07)  0.003 (0.57) 
Employment Access     0.001 (1.25)  0.001 (0.69)  0.001 (0.71) 
Mean Family Income / $100,000      0.015 (2.20)  0.004 (0.60) 
Fraction African-American       -0.008  (0.79) 
Fraction Hispanic      0.003 (0.13) 
Fraction Non-Native     -0.032  (1.69) 
Sample Size  395,273 395,390 395,623  384,131 
Notes:   The models are estimated using two stage least squares where the set of housing attribute instruments have 
been reduced by eliminating possibly endogenous housing attributes like no kitchen in unit or mobile home.  All 
models control for the demographic attributes shown in Tables 2 and 3 plus housing attributes, industry and 
Occupation-MSA fixed effects.  All standard errors are clustered at the Occupation-MSA level, and T-statistics are 
shown in parentheses.    
Table 7:  Log Wage Models with Smaller Set of Instruments
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Occupations with Supervision 
Commute Time  0.067 (2.80)  0.092 (2.15)  0.117 (2.68)  0.094 (1.96) 
Employment Access     0.013 (0.85)  0.010 (0.67)  0.011 (0.82) 
Mean Family Income / $100,000      0.115 (3.05)  0.187 (4.68) 
Fraction African-American      0.091  (1.97) 
Fraction Hispanic      -0.143  (1.06) 
Fraction Non-Native      0.252  (1.80) 
R-Square  0.314  0.314 0.314  0.314 
Sample Size  545,727 
Occupations without Supervision 
Commute Time  -0.052 (2.00)  0.022 (0.60)  0.014 (0.40)  -0.003 (0.07) 
Employment Access     0.030 (2.32)  0.024 (1.91)  0.024 (1.97) 
Mean Family Income / $100,000      0.120 (1.87)  0.189 (3.03) 
Fraction African-American        -0.084 (0.82) 
Fraction Hispanic      0.230 (1.08) 
Fraction Non-Native      0.099 (0.57) 
R-Square  0.290 0.290 0.290  0.290 
Sample Size  357,528 
Notes:   The models are estimated using two stage least squares where the set of housing attribute instruments have 
been reduced by eliminating possibly endogenous housing attributes like no kitchen in unit or mobile home.  All 
models control for the demographic attributes shown in Tables 2 and 3 plus housing attributes, industry and 
Occupation-MSA fixed effects.  All standard errors are clustered at the Occupation-MSA level, and T-statistics are 
shown in parentheses.  Table 8:  Employment Models with Education Interaction
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Occupations with Supervision 
Commute Time  -0.025 (4.12)  -0.023 (3.28)  -0.012 (2.07)  -0.007 (1.12) 
Commute Time*Four Year Degree  -0.022 (4.22)  -0.021 (4.18)  -0.015 (2.65)  -0.016 (3.12) 
Employment Access     0.001 (0.80)  0.001 (0.52)  0.005 (3.12) 
Mean Family Income / $100,000      0.045 (5.74)  0.019 (2.32) 
Fraction African-American      -0.055  (4.73) 
Fraction Hispanic      -0.098  (5.25) 
Fraction Non-Native      0.070  (4.05) 
Sample Size  654,152 654,356 653,051  647,268 
Occupations without Supervision 
Commute Time  0.005 (0.83)  0.008 (1.30)  0.006 (1.07)  0.010 (1.54) 
Commute Time*Four Year Degree  -0.011 (2.34)  -0.010 (2.27)  -0.010 (2.23)  -0.012 (2.59) 
Employment Access     0.001 (1.23)  0.001 (0.54)  0.001 (0.50) 
Mean Family Income / $100,000      0.015 (2.18)  0.005 (0.71) 
Fraction African-American       -0.007  (0.74) 
Fraction Hispanic      0.002 (0.11) 
Fraction Non-Native     -0.032  (1.65) 
Sample Size  395,602 396,766 398,321  385,678 
Notes:   The models that include an interaction between having a four year college degree and commute time are 
estimated using two stage least squares where the set of housing attribute instruments have been reduced by 
eliminating possibly endogenous housing attributes like no kitchen in unit or mobile home.  All models control for 
the demographic attributes shown in Tables 2 and 3 plus housing attributes, industry and Occupation-MSA fixed 
effects.  All standard errors are clustered at the Occupation-MSA level, and T-statistics are shown in parentheses.   Table 9:  Log Wage Models with Education Interaction
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Occupations with Supervision 
Commute Time  0.028 (1.16)  0.049 (1.82)  0.074 (2.71)  0.048 (1.68) 
Commute Time*Four Year Degree  0.224 (2.26)  0.222 (2.29)  0.222 (2.27)  0.224 (2.30) 
Employment Access     0.011 (0.79)  0.008 (0.58)  0.009 (0.74) 
Mean Family Income / $100,000      0.114 (3.05)  0.190 (4.83) 
Fraction African-American      0.094  (2.07) 
Fraction Hispanic      -0.147  (1.13) 
Fraction Non-Native      0.263  (2.02) 
R-Square  0.314  0.314 0.314  0.314 
Sample Size  545,727 
Occupations without Supervision 
Commute Time  -0.066 (1.99)  0.008 (0.21)  0.001 (0.03)  -0.016 (0.45) 
Commute Time*Four Year Degree  0.021 (0.65)  0.021 (0.64)  0.020 (0.61)  0.021 (0.65) 
Employment Access     0.030 (2.32)  0.024 (1.91)  0.024 (1.97) 
Mean Family Income / $100,000      0.119 (1.88)  0.189 (3.03) 
Fraction African-American        -0.083 (0.81) 
Fraction Hispanic      0.228 (1.08) 
Fraction Non-Native      0.103 (0.60) 
R-Square  0.290 0.290 0.290  0.290 
Sample Size  357,528 
Notes:   The models that include an interaction between having a four year college degree and commute time are 
estimated using two stage least squares where the set of housing attribute instruments have been reduced by 
eliminating possibly endogenous housing attributes like no kitchen in unit or mobile home.  All models control for 
the demographic attributes shown in Tables 2 and 3 plus housing attributes, industry and Occupation-MSA fixed 
effects.  All standard errors are clustered at the Occupation-MSA level, and T-statistics are shown in parentheses.  
 